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Oxford Handbooks Online. Publications Pages Publications Pages. Recently viewed 0 Save Search. Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy. Federal regulations affect many groups of people, who have often challenged those regulations in court. Because litigation is a slow and expensive way to change regulations, Congress passed the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of to limit the need for litigation by opening the rulemaking process to those affected by it.
The act encouraged federal agencies to engage in negotiated rule-making. If an agency agrees to the proposed regulations, for example, it publishes the proposals in the Federal Register and then participates in a negotiating committee overseen by a third party.
Agreements reached by the committee are then open to the normal public review process. Parties to negotiated rule-making agree not to sue over the rules. In some cases, executive agencies function like courts: They hold hearings in which each party presents arguments and evidence for or against certain rules. The executive agencies then make a decision that settles the argument between the agencies.
This power is called administrative adjudication, and it involves applying rules and precedents to specific cases. Since the Carter Administration in the late s, the federal government has frequently sought to remove regulations established by earlier administrations, a practice called deregulation.
The federal bureaucracy usually carries out deregulation, often with encouragement from the president. In the late s and early s, for example, the government deregulated the airline industry, significantly increasing competition and lowering prices.
Due to multiplicity of passing bills by the legislature, and coupled with the procedure the bills will have to pass through before they will become law, time is of essence in law making and for the legislatures alike.
For this reason, delegated legislation is very important. It will automatically save the time of the legislatures, as time needed to deliberate on rules and regulations will be judiciously utilized in other important law processing.
This is also one of the good reasons for having delegated legislation. One important areas where delegated legislation is very vital is during emergency situation. In Nigeria, the president is empowered to legislate and control the situation. Emergency period connotes the period when the federation is at war, and there is in force a resolution passed by the National Assembly declaring that a state of public emergency exist or a resolution of each house of parliament supported by not less than two third of all the members of the House declaring that democratic institutions in Nigeria are threatened by subversion.
Section of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is clear on this position by providing that, the president may by instrument published in the official Gazette of the government of the Federation; issue a proclamation of state of emergency in the Federation of any part thereof.
It is also the argument of some legal scholars that one of the reasons for delegated legislation is to sustain regional development. Where a particular region is deemed to be developed and such development needs to be sustained, the law here may be delegated. Many countries adopted this method. For example, in Iraq, the Kurds were given some limited powers through delegation of powers to manage the Iraq Kurds.
Nigeria too adopted this method from — prior to the creation of states. This is undoubtedly one of the good reasons for delegated legislation in most countries. Evidently, the activities of law making are not easy task for the parliamentarians; the process the bill will follow through before becoming a law are tedious. Oversight functions undertaken by the legislatures are also tedious; hence, it will lead to increase of work and task if they are to legislate on every piece of legislation.
This is obviously another reason for delegated legislation. In order to reduce this pressure on their part, it becomes necessary that they must delegate powers to the administrative officers. This relief will enable the legislature to concentrate on principles rather than details of social regulation as well as matters of local interest.
By this, delegated legislation also ensures that law are well drafted. The work of the legislature supposed to be for a limited time, while the execution of the law made by them is for long time unless such law is repealed, modified or abrogated. This indeed suggests that time constraint may incapacitate the legislatures to take care of every law. In light of this, there is need to delegate powers to Administrative Officers who are deemed to be in seat until they retire to control other aspects of the implementation of the law, even if it will extend to making other subsidiary laws.
You will agree with me that events and issues are not static, but changes from time to time. This is the more reason why delegated legislation is necessary in every part of the world. In my view, delegated legislature is an inevitable necessity. The impact of dynamicsm of events makes law to be dynamic.
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