But when we do become aware of it, still further insights into embodied experience become possible. For a phenomenology of embodiment, this means turning to the body of direct experience in a way that is even more radical than acknowledging everyday encounters with embodied persons in the personalistic attitude.
Why is it more radical? One mode of inquiry that Husserl uses in his descriptive investigations of the body of lived experience is eidetic phenomenology. Husserl therefore speaks of all such bodily movement as pertaining to the I in a broad sense that encompasses, but also includes more than, the active, awake I. When I turn to the left to look for the bird in the birdbath, my eye, head, and torso movements are typically vectorially combined into one integrated gesture.
In this way the interarticulated kinaesthetic systems work together as one total kinaesthetic system whose multifarious possibilities of coordination typically take on the more circumscribed form of a habitual repertoire of familiar movement possibilities and customary ways to move. Even within this more limited leeway, however, motility is characterized by a certain essential freedom that can be contrasted with the physical motion of spatial objects.
This by no means implies complete freedom in every case—once I jump off the diving board, it is too late to change my mind, and I am headed for the water, since—unlike a bird—I have no way to fly back up into the sky.
But the lived motility in which kinaesthetic consciousness holds sway is more typically experienced as reversible: having turned my head to the left, I can turn it back to the right; having extended my hand, I can withdraw it; having gone in one direction, I can retrace my steps. Such descriptions retrieve kinaesthetic functioning from its anonymity, but remain abstract as long as its constitutive role is not specified more precisely. For example, enacting certain kinaesthetic possibilities brings certain correlative perceptual appearances to givenness in a concordant, regulated, non-arbitrary manner.
And the same fundamental correlation between kinaesthetic capabilities and coherent fields of spatial display holds good for movement in any direction, as well as for the intersensorial world. Early extensive analyses are found in the lectures published in Thing and Space, but Husserl refined his account throughout his life.
Although Husserl gives various accounts of intersubjectivity, the present article pulls together some pieces of the puzzle that depend directly on his work with kinaesthetic consciousness. First of all, it is possible for at least some enactments of my own directly experienced motility to be co-given to me in the form of something perceivable in the same way as things of the world are.
Similarly, the kinaesthetic experience of speaking, singing, or crying out is paired with sounds appearing in the same audial field in which other sounds are given. However, a further step must at least be touched on, one that draws upon yet another important distinction—that between the transcendental and the mundane. Without going into detail about his approach to the problem which is also known as the paradox of subjectivity—how can the very consciousness that constitutes the world simultaneously be a part of this world?
In any case, however, the Husserlian critique of presuppositions concerning the body leads to something like the possibility of transcendental corporeality—a notion that places many aspects of the Western philosophical tradition itself into question. Elizabeth A.
Behnke Email: sppb openaccess. Introduction a. Sources and Themes Edmund Husserl — , the founder of phenomenology, addressed the body throughout his philosophical life, with much of the relevant material to be found in lecture courses, research manuscripts, and book-length texts not published during his lifetime. Terms and Concepts Husserlian phenomenology stands in opposition to naturalism , for which material nature is simply a given and conscious life itself is part of nature, to be approached with natural-scientific methods oriented toward empirical facts and causal explanations.
Embodied Personhood Summary: Husserl shows that embodied experience is geared into the world as a communal nexus of meaningful situations, expressive gestures, and practical activities.
The Body as a Center of Orientation One mode of inquiry that Husserl uses in his descriptive investigations of the body of lived experience is eidetic phenomenology. Kinaesthetic Capabilities and Perceptual Appearances Such descriptions retrieve kinaesthetic functioning from its anonymity, but remain abstract as long as its constitutive role is not specified more precisely.
References and Further Reading a. Primary Sources Husserl, Edmund. Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen Ulrich Claesges. It places perception at the heart of human understanding. Comments RSS. You are commenting using your WordPress. You are commenting using your Google account. You are commenting using your Twitter account. You are commenting using your Facebook account.
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And this might be quite wrong. To begin with, there is a strong case for thinking that many mental processes are essentially embodied. The brainbound view pictures the brain as a powerful executive, planning every aspect of behaviour and sending detailed instructions to the muscles. But, as work in robotics has illustrated, there are more efficient ways of doing things, which nature almost certainly employs.
The more biologically realistic robots perform basic patterns of movement naturally, in virtue of their passive dynamics , without the use of motors and controllers. Intelligent, powered control is then achieved by continuously monitoring and tweaking these bodily processes, sharing the control task between brain and body.
Such a strategy relies essentially on body activity. As well as being embodied, mental processes can also be extended to incorporate external artefacts. To illustrate this, Clark and Chalmers describe two people each trying to work out where various shapes fit in a puzzle.
One does it in his head, forming and rotating mental images of the shapes, the other by pressing a button to rotate shapes on a screen. Since the first process counts as mental, the second should too, Clark and Chalmers argue. What matters is what the object does, not where it is located.
The rationale is the same as that for identifying the mind with the brain rather than the soul; the mind is whatever performs mental functions.
Think about doing a long division with pen and paper. Dementia is a sign that you feel uncertain or insecure about your future and what you will do for the rest of your life.
You have given up on changing your life into something that you want to live for. You need to take charge of your life and create what you want in order to look forward to your future. In other words, your thoughts are distracting your from what you need to focus on in your present situation. You need to bring your attention back to the present so you can see the reality of your situation. Your mind has insisted on controlling various aspects of your life which has caused immense mental pressure.
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