Yes, Kosovo is a country. Since we call Kosovo a republic. Why do some countries do not recognize Kosovo as. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.
Kosovo Info. Independence of Kosovo. Kosovo independence: a new flag The new republic has had its own flag since the independence. The six stars represent the six biggest ethnic groups in the country. Pingback: Is Kosovo a country? Actively scan device characteristics for identification. Use precise geolocation data. Select personalised content. Create a personalised content profile. Measure ad performance. Select basic ads. Create a personalised ads profile. Select personalised ads. Apply market research to generate audience insights.
Measure content performance. As long as a state provides a minority group the ability to speak their language, practice their culture in a meaningful way, and effectively participate in the political community, then that group is said to have internal self-determination. Secession, or "external self-determination," is generally disfavored. In re Secession of Quebec , the Supreme Court of Canada found that "[a] right to external self-determination which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession arises only in the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances?
Although issues of secession rarely receive formal adjudication, state practice, court opinions, and other authoritative writings, point the way to categorizing what are the "extreme cases" and "carefully defined circumstances" under which the privilege of secession exists. Any attempt to claim legal secession"that is, where secession trumps territorial integrity" must at least show that:. The commission of jurists who arbitrated the status of the Aaland Islands in found that for the purposes of self-determination one cannot treat a small fraction of people as one would a nation as a whole.
Thus, the Swedes on the Aaland Islands, who were only a small fraction of the totality of the Swedish "people" did not have a strong claim for secession in comparison to, for example, Finland, which, when it broke away from Russian rule, contained the near totality of the Finnish people.
One may argue that the Kosovars are a "people", having inhabited Kosovo for centuries. However, the Kosovar Albanians are more generally perceived as an Albanian ethnic enclave, rather than a nation unto themselves. This definition of the word "people" as "nation" has been criticized for being too restrictive. Consequently, it remains an open question whether widespread support of Kosovo's independence would signal a shift in the definition of "people" so that the term no longer represents a complete ethnic nation but can be used to refer to a homogenous ethnic enclave within another nation.
The Aaland Islands report found that there was no right to secede absent "a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power to the detriment of a section of population. It was mass human rights abuses that led to NATO's intervention.
It should also be noted, however, that human rights abuses have been reported to have been committed by Kosovar Albanians as well. To the extent the international community considers it relevant whether human rights abuses are ongoing or historic, the situation in Kosovo is ambiguous. In relation to this question, one may argue that the ongoing international presence in Kosovo is legally relevant as it is evidence of the international community's determination that the situation in Kosovo was and is highly volatile and that it cannot be solved completely via domestic political structures.
The political situation prior to the declaration of independence did not appear to offer any realistic alternatives to secession. As of December , the two sides could not seem to resolve their differences and the Troika has declared the political negotiations a failure. It is unlikely that anything short of military intervention could have kept Kosovo within Serbia. Thus, it appears that most, if not all, realistic options other than separation had failed.
As should be clear from this analysis, the basic framework provided by international law permits arguments for and against secession. This is the quintessential "tough case. However, if we take as a given that secession is not absolutely prohibited by international law, then the case of Kosovo presents a set of facts that may be persuasive: an ethnic group though perhaps not a "nation" , within a region with historically defined boundaries Kosovo as a province , after an international intervention to prevent a humanitarian disaster being caused by the predecessor state, and after negotiations with the predecessor state leading to a complete deadlock, that seeks independence via a declaration that is coordinated with, and supported by, a significant segment of the international community.
It thus stands in contrast to other claims of a "right" to secede, such as those of Transnistria, which due to different material facts would fail under the same legal analysis.
In difficult situations such as these, the issue of legality often shifts from the question of the legality of secession, to the question of the legality of the recognition of secession, a subtly different, but nonetheless different, question.
The EU memorandum on Resolution contends that "[g]enerally, once an entity has emerged as a state in the sense of international law, a political decision can be taken to recognise [sic] it. Rather, recognition merely accepts a factual occurrence. Thus recognition is "declaratory" as opposed to "constitutive.
To the contrary, a good argument may be made that states should not recognize a new state if such recognition would perpetuate a breach of international law. The treatise Oppenheim's Ninth , Sec. But, absent any qualification, that argument cannot be legally correct. Changing the boundaries of a sovereign state Serbia in and of itself would not make Kosovar independence illegal because, as discussed above, the international community has come to accept the legality of secession under certain circumstances.
Furthermore, the self-determination analysis is very fact specific, such that absolute arguments of illegality become difficult. And, state practice evinces that, absent a clear indication of illegality, in matters of state recognition there is considerable deference to the political prerogatives of outside states to decide whether or not to recognize an aspirant state.
Kosovo is still protected by 16, NATO-led peacekeepers, and the alliance boosted its patrols over the weekend in hopes of discouraging violence. International police, meanwhile, deployed to back up local forces in the tense north. Sidestepping the U. Sunday's declaration was carefully orchestrated with the U. But by sidestepping the U. China, a veto-wielding U. Security Council member that had close ties with Milosevic's government, expressed its "deep concern" over Kosovo's declaration and called on the province to reach a "proper solution through negotiations" with Serbia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has argued that independence without U. Serbia promises recriminations Serbia's government ruled out a military response as part of a secret "action plan" drafted earlier this week, but warned that it would downgrade relations with any foreign government that recognizes Kosovo's independence. Meanwhile, Serbia's government minister for Kosovo, Slobodan Samardzic, said Serbia would increase its presence in the roughly 15 percent of Kosovo that is Serb-controlled in an apparent attempt to partition the province.
Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu sought to allay Serbs' concerns, telling them: "I understand today is a fearful day for you all, but your rights and your property will be protected today as it will be always. At a special session of parliament boycotted by 10 minority Serb lawmakers and televised live nationwide, sustained applause erupted after the rest of the chamber unanimously adopted the declaration of independence, which was scripted on parchment.
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